When Saambou Bank collapsed on 9 February 2002, 20twenty, its newly formed online banking arm, had only been in operation for six months. During the six months it had been in operation, however, 20twenty had managed to capture the hearts of 40 000 customers with its innovative approach and fanatical service ethic: so much so, that most of its customers did not leave when Saambou collapsed, but stayed faithful to 20twenty until a rescuer came along 18 months later. The rescuer was UK bank, Standard Chartered, which wanted to open up an operation in South Africa and liked 20twenty’s business model. Standard Chartered wanted 20twenty again to differentiate itself from its competitors by providing innovative banking services and fanatical dedication to its customers. However, this strategy might have worked two years previously, but would it still hold in 2004 when 20twenty relaunched? And if so, would it be sustainable in the long run?

No. Pages: 8 

To order this case, click here

This case looks at the well-known failure of the computer-aided despatch system that the London Ambulance Service implemented in 1992. As the date for publication of the results of the enquiry into the incident approaches, John Wilby, former chief executive of London Ambulance Service wonders what went so desperately wrong at LAS. Was it just the IT industry that generated so many problems and cost so many millions, or was the LAS failure the result of gross mismanagement? Or perhaps it was both? The furore surrounding the failure of the Computer-Aided Despatch (CAD) system that had been implemented at LAS the month before seemed to indicate that there was more to it than simply placing the blame wherever it fell.

No. Pages: 18 

To order this case, click here

It was December 2000 and John Robertson, the chief information officer (CIO) of Discovery, a healthcare finance and life insurance company, had to decide what to do with DiscoveryWorld, the group’s ecommerce problem child. The project had been conceived at the end of 1999, in the full flush of dotcom optimism. Now the project was a source of ever-increasing conflict and dissension within the group. Operating as a separate division that reported directly to the board, it was gobbling money and rubbing other members of the group up the wrong way with an arrogant and dismissive attitude. Moreover, DiscoveryWorld had not delivered on its promises, although there was definite potential in some of the functionality that it was developing. There had been high expectations of DiscoveryWorld when it started out, but the devil seemed to be in the implementation. Was the project worth salvaging? If so, what was the best way to do this?

No. Pages: 17 

To order this case, click here

It was the beginning of December 2001. The revised “go live” deadline of 1 March 2002 for IST’s ERP implementation programme was approaching fast and Nico Scholtz, IST’s ERP project manager was not sure that the system would be ready by that date. Moreover, there appeared still to be some strong internal resistance to the system. Scholtz had to recommend a course of action to IST CEO, Harry Coetzee. This is the third in a series of three cases that looks at the ERP implementation process at IST.

No. Pages: 12 

To order this case, click here

In July 2000 the enterprise resource planning (ERP) steering committee of the specialised engineering and information technology group, IST, had a choice between two value-added resellers and their software options: IFS with its own Oracle-based system, or Resolution Software with the Great Plains system. Neither IFS nor Great Plains/Resolution showed the perfect fit and the steering committee had heard many horror stories about ERP implementation at other firms. It did not want the same to happen at IST. This is the first in a series of three cases that looks at the ERP implementation process at IST.

No. Pages: 32 

To order this case, click here

When the new chief executive of IST, Harry Coetzee, took up his position in March 2001, he couldn’t believe the shambles that was the ERP implementation programme at IST. The group had commissioned Resolution Software to implement the Great Plains system, but the process had gone badly awry and was in danger of being derailed completely. What had gone wrong? And what did he need to do to get the process back on track? This is the second in a series of three cases that looks at the ERP implementation process at IST.

No. Pages: 9 . 

To order this case, click here

It was the beginning of December 2001. The revised “go live” deadline of 1 March 2002 for IST’s ERP implementation programme was approaching fast and Nico Scholtz, IST’s ERP project manager was not sure that the system would be ready by that date. Moreover, there appeared still to be some strong internal resistance to the system. Scholtz had to recommend a course of action to IST CEO, Harry Coetzee. This is the third in a series of three cases that looks at the ERP implementation process at IST.

No. Pages: 12  

To order this case, click here

With IT playing an ever more fundamental role in daily business activity, there is a growing acknowledgement that IT influences organisational success. Businesses rely on IT for competitive advantage, but often board and management expectations of IT are not aligned with reality. A deluge of virus attacks and the ominous threat of personal liability for failure to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable IT risk have businesses in a panic over improving IT governance. However, between a lack of understanding about the business impacts of IT, a mass of e-commerce laws and governance frameworks, and the expection on the CIO to improve ROI, increase service levels, and enhance security while maintaining flat budgets and headcount, boards and management need to demystify IT Governance, and understand how to apply the relevant principles in their business.

No. Pages: 18 

To order this case, click here

It was almost three years since the South African subsidiary of the London-listed financial services organisation, Old Mutual (OMSA), had signed an information technology infrastructure outsource contract with CSC. Thus far, the contract had worked out well for both companies and the relationship between them was good, but the two groups were about to enter a new phase in the agreement. OMSA was CSC’s first outsourcing contract in South Africa. The focus during the first three years had been on establishing the relationship between the two companies and bedding down systems and procedures. CSC had consciously not looked for new business, so that its attention would not be divided. Now the organisation wanted to expand and take on other clients.

As Doreen Buultjens, head of group technology services at OMSA, considered these developments, she was concerned that until now, CSC had delivered the required service levels only because OMSA had been its exclusive focus in South Africa. Would she have to change the way in which the contract was managed, or could it continue as it was?

No. Pages: 23 

To order this case, click here

In 1984, three former Wits MBA graduates established BSW (Pty) Ltd. By the late 1980s, the founders of BSW recognised that knowledge management was the basis of their company’s vision and philosophy. In April 1999, BSW’s chief information officer, Pauline Smith, was charged with the task of recommending a knowledge management strategy to guide the company. Smith had to decide whether the company should adopt one of the models used by the consulting firms whose core asset was knowledge, such as Andersen Consulting and Ernst & Young, or to develop a customised strategy to meet the specific needs of BSW.

No. Pages: 18 

To order this case, click here

André Botha, acting knowledge management (KM) officer for Sasol Limited, faced considerable challenges. In 1998, Sasol had embarked on a KM journey, championed by KM officer Marina Hiscock. In 2000, the group had adopted a global KM strategy to extend KM to all strategic business units (SBUs) throughout the group. While some SBUs had implemented KM successfully, in others implementation had progressed slowly.

In April 2006, Hiscock had resigned and the task of taking KM forward in the Sasol Group fell on Botha, an engineer who had successfully introduced KM at Sasol Mining. Now, in July 2006, it was time for Botha to take stock of what KM had achieved and consider what Sasol should do next.

No. Pages: 24 

To order this case, click here

William Wilsnagh, business unit director of technology services at NamITech, reflected on a rather alarming incident that had just occurred one of NamITech’s clients. A virus had hit the client’s network, resulting in downtime of a full day. NamITech had won this client a year previously, in November 2002 and the client’s IS security had improved greatly. But, for Wilsnagh, the virus incident highlighted the need to extend the scope of NamITech’s services. Information systems security was all about ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. Although viruses were the high-profile enemies in the IS security war, he knew that there was more to it than virus detection, prevention and elimination. He just needed to apply his mind to identifying potential risks and ways of addressing them.

No. Pages: 13 

To order this case, click here

It was the beginning of March 2003 and STRATE, the organisation that settled all equity trades in South Africa electronically, was about to merge with the Universal Exchange Corporation (UNEXcor), an organisation that settled bond transactions electronically. Monica Singer, CEO of STRATE, and future CEO of the merged entity, wanted to implement a balanced scorecard driven knowledge management process in UNEXcor that STRATE had successfully embarked on a year ago. Yet the process had been demanding: one that had required time and trust from all in the firm. Singer knew that it might be more complicated to institute the system amongst UNEXcor employees and get the necessary buy-in. Should she take a big-bang approach and simply tell the UNEXcor employees that this was the way it was going to be? Or should she adopt a more phased approach, trying to earn their trust beforehand?

No. Pages: 21

To order this case, click here

By 2003, Quadrem, a global e-marketplace that facilitated electronic transactions between buyers and suppliers from the mining, metals and minerals industry, was in its third year of operation. While some of the regions in which it operated were profitable, Quadrem as a whole was not yet profitable, and neither was its division in Africa. The shareholders expected Quadrem to break even by the end of quarter two in 2004. With this in mind, Brandon Spear, regional vice president of Quadrem Africa, based in South Africa, was preparing for the next quarterly shareholders meeting, which was due shortly. He knew he would have to answer questions on how Quadrem Africa could increase its growth to help Quadrem globally to achieve breakeven.

No. Pages: 23 

To order this case, click here