When Saambou Bank collapsed on 9 February 2002, 20twenty, its newly formed online banking arm, had only been in operation for six months. During the six months it had been in operation, however, 20twenty had managed to capture the hearts of 40 000 customers with its innovative approach and fanatical service ethic: so much so, that most of its customers did not leave when Saambou collapsed, but stayed faithful to 20twenty until a rescuer came along 18 months later. The rescuer was UK bank, Standard Chartered, which wanted to open up an operation in South Africa and liked 20twenty’s business model. Standard Chartered wanted 20twenty again to differentiate itself from its competitors by providing innovative banking services and fanatical dedication to its customers. However, this strategy might have worked two years previously, but would it still hold in 2004 when 20twenty relaunched? And if so, would it be sustainable in the long run?

No. Pages: 8 

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By May 2007, African Bank Investments Limited (ABIL) had, under the leadership of Leon Kirkinis, become one of the predominant players in the provision of financial credit services to the mass employed population of South Africa. Over the years it had worked very hard to attain the position of market leader in the microcredit industry (with an estimated 31% of total industry loans) using a focused cost differentiation strategy that had enabled the company to achieve the lowest cost to income ratio (27%) in the industry.

Kirkinis was proud of ABIL’s achievements to date. However, he was concerned about what the bank could do to improve its competitive edge and extend its reach in the face of its major future challenge: taking advantage of the largely untapped but highly lucrative, small-, medium- and micro- enterprise (SMME) sector of the market.

No.of Pages: 17

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On 20 February 2004, Ghana’s parliament approved the merger between AngloGold and Ashanti Goldfields Company (Ashanti) and, on 26 April 2004 − a year after Bobby Godsell announced that negotiations had commenced − the parties concluded the details of the arrangement. It was the largest such deal ever on the African continent, and was widely considered a triumph for Africa.

In October 2007, when Australian Mark Cutifani succeeded Godsell as chief executive of AngloGold Ashanti, the African empire had seen the departure of Sir Sam Jonah and several years of turmoil in the Ghana operations – and specifically Obuasi, the mine with the deep-level ore bodies that had originally attracted AngloGold’s interest. Faced with declining productivity, financial losses and low morale at the Obuasi mine, Cutifani had three options: close the mine; sell it to a willing buyer; or intervene to give it a last chance.

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In February 2002, Johannesburg-based AngloGold Ltd lost its position as No1 gold producer to America’s Newmont Gold Corporation when Newmont outbid AngloGold in a merger deal with Australia’s largest gold company, Normandy Mining Ltd. Urgently, AngloGold had to find other ways of surviving the industry’s dwindling resources. Now, on the evening of 3 September 2002, Paul Dennison, AngloGold’s business development analyst, was considering the options for presentation to the chief executive, Bobby Godsell, in the morning.

No.of Pages: 21

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Having met in London with Sir Sam Jonah, chief executive of Ashanti, in September 2002, Bobby Godsell, chief executive of AngloGold, announced on 16 April 2003 that discussions with Ashanti regarding a proposed merger had commenced. By August 2003, merger discussions were proceeding as planned, when the shock entry of Randgold Resources as a competitive bidder forced Anglogold to reassess its strategy.

The battle for Ashanti between Randgold (with a market capitalisation of $600 million, less than half that of Ashanti’s $1.28 billion) and AngloGold (market capitalisation of $8.2 billion was a real-life “David versus Goliath” fight, which captured the public’s attention. While AngloGold’s bid ($1.1 billion) came with technical competence, Randgold Resources, with a “huge” offer of $1.46 billion, appealed to people’s emotions and sense of national pride. At the beginning of October 2003, it was still unclear when the Ghanaian government would make its decision. Paul Dennison, AngloGold’s manager of mergers and acquisitions, needed to advise CEO Bobby Godsell on the best course of action.

No.of pages: 12

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In late 2017, Wits Business School MBA student, Bulelani Moyo pondered all the information he had gathered for a proposal he was considering putting to Jeff Miller, CEO of South African venture capital company Grovest, for investing in a new and innovative hotel concept in three locations on Cape Route 62 (Route 62), a tourist route covering parts of the Western Cape and Eastern Cape. He believed that there could be scope for a disruptive hotel model on that route. However, for such a hotel to be viable, it was crucial to target the right audience. Moyo was contemplating whether there were opportunities in four customer segments: the “ageing biker”, the “millennial adventurer”, the “foreign road-tripper” and the “travelling salesman”. As he read through his research, he wondered whether he had enough to be able to make a convincing case for any of these markets to Miller.

No of pages: 26

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On June 23 2005, Keith Rankin, managing director of Avis Rent-A-Car Southern Africa, was preparing a proposal for the June 30 board of directors meeting. His concern was how to meet demand during the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup, given the severe space constraints at Johannesburg International Airport (JIA).

No.of pages: 8

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A plane flies overhead. As if on automatic pilot, Gidon Novick glances out his second floor office window. In reality, he doesn’t really notice the plane. His thoughts are elsewhere. He is planning: considering possibilities, ideas that could work for the either kulula.com or British Airways Comair. “We are always trying to improve our service and stay true to our brands,” he says.

Novick is a visionary, an ideas man. He and Eric Venter are joint Chief Executive Officers of Comair. Comair is the umbrella company for the premium market airline, British Airways Comair and the low-cost airline, kulula.com. While they have two polar opposite brands in their stable, they have so far managed to stay true to both of them. “The average passenger is not even aware that Kulula is related to British Airways, never mind run by the same people,” says Jackie Walters, professor of transport and logistics management, University of Johannesburg.

No.of pages: 6

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One of the most important black economic empowerment events of the period 2004 to 2009 was the promulgation of the Broad-based Black Economic Codes of Good Conduct (the Codes) in February 2007. In 2004, when the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act 2003 (the 2003 Act) was promulgated, it provided a legal framework on which to base fair and equitable participation in private sector organisations by the widest possible number of black South Africans. The 2003 Act was the culmination of a long debate and subsequent legislative process. According to the government, it was “but one of many government interventions to redress the economic imbalances that were the result of apartheid”. The purpose of the 2003 Act was “to put mechanisms in place to accelerate the entry of black people into the first economy”.

Essential to the new legislation was the broad-based approach, which was the outcome of growing criticism that the previous approaches had been narrow in focus and had failed to sustain empowerment. The practice of putting ownership in the hands of only a few members of the black community was central to the government’s concerns. On the other hand, some in the business community considered the task of implementing black economic empowerment, as it stood prior to the 2003 Act, to be very onerous. There was a climate of growing concern about the narrow approach and a growing resistance from some businesses.

No.of pages: 14

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The objective of this note is to define black economic empowerment (BEE) and understand its context in South Africa. The reasons for black economic empowerment and the enabling legislation are discussed. The note also addresses the impact of black economic empowerment on South African businesses, as well as some of the challenges faced at the time this note was written.

No. Pages: 14 

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In November 2009, bidorbuy was the largest South African online marketplace. Following a failed attempt earlier in the year to purchase bidorbuy, kalahari.net – a subsidiary of Naspers and a highly successful online retailer – indicated that it was going to compete directly with bidorbuy as an online marketplace. Andy Higgins, managing director of bidorbuy, was a firm believer that, if his company could reach a certain level of wide-scale popularity, it would virtually be impossible for a newcomer to compete. Higgins therefore had to find ways for bidorbuy to do this before kalahari.net entered the market.

No.of pages: 18

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In December 2008, Charlene Lewison, marketing director of the Johannesburg-based family business, Birdi Golf Apparel, surveyed the company’s well-stocked shelves with pride – but also with a growing sense of unease. In the past 12 years, Birdi had become an established brand on both the professional and amateur golf circuits in South Africa.

In recent months, however, sales had started to slow as the economic crisis took effect, and Lewison knew the time had come to rethink her company’s marketing strategy and planning. Should the company look at new products, or perhaps new market segments?

Should it retain its ‘niche’ status or broaden its base, or should it try to penetrate its current corporate business further? 

No.of pages: 18

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The objective of this note is to define black economic empowerment (BEE) and understand its context in South Africa. The reasons for black economic empowerment and the enabling legislation are discussed. The note also addresses the impact of black economic empowerment on South African businesses, as well as some of the challenges faced at the time this note was written.

No.of pages: 17

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It was June 2010 and Dave van Niekerk, the chief executive officer (CEO) of micro-lending company Blue Financial Services (BFS), had just handed in his resignation. BFS, which listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange AltX  in 2006, had in less than four years expanded its operations to 15 African countries from an original five and employed more than 3 000 people. During this time, however, the company had faced escalating problems that had resulted in a write-off of more than R1 billion and a share price – which had reached a high of 700 cents – dropping to 15 cents. A rescue deal by turnaround expert Johan Meiring of private equity firm Mayibuye Group (Pty) Ltd was on the cards, and had forced van Niekerk’s resignation. Van Niekerk asked himself what had gone wrong and could the company, under new management, be saved?

No of Pages: 20

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In January 2009, young entrepreneurs Ayanda Qunu and Thembi Bhayi abandoned their plans to start a fully owned contact centre, Yahluma Solutions Ltd, in Buffalo City in the Eastern Cape, South Africa. Even with the assistance of a financial incentive from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to encourage the establishment of business process outsourcing and offshoring (BPO&O) businesses, they asked themselves: could they have competed globally and locally? Was their decision to abandon their plans correct?

No of pages: 12 pages

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Irene Ivy-Schuurmans and Dale Kneen started the Cape Herb and Spice Company in 1992, selling their wares from a modest barrow at the Cape Town Waterfront. They were housemates with full-time jobs, but both were passionate about cooking “wacky, creative and unusual” gourmet food with interesting herbs and spices that weren’t commercially available.

“It was while hunting for a specific herb for a specific dish we wanted to make that we stumbled onto this idea for a business,” recalls Kneen. “We thought it was unlikely we were the only foodies out there who wanted the perfect herb or spice, or combination of them, to make the perfect dish.i”

So the Cape Herb and Spice Company (CH&SC) was launched, and Ivy-Schuurmans and Kneen began locating and selling those speciality herbs that were so difficult to find. They never imagined then that 14 years later, they would have an international, multi-million rand company and that this once-small business would reach a stage where it could go one of two very diverse ways: keep up its speciality status or become a mass producer of herbs and spices.

Ivy-Schuurmans, now the new product development director, and Kneen, who heads up the procurement department,are yet undecided, but know that the wrong decision could be the death-knell for their business.

No.of pages: 9

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By December 2006, Capitec Bank, South Africa’s newest listed retail bank, had come a long way from its origins as a microlending organisation in 2001. Over time it had started introducing other banking services to its entry-level clients, so that by 2006 it offered all basic banking services. Capitec’s chief executive for marketing and corporate affairs, Carl Fischer, considered the organisation’s strategic plan for 2007: to position itself as a proper bank in a much broader target market. He realised that the key to survival for a low-cost bank in South Africa lay in high volumes, but still wrestled with the question of how Capitec could overcome the current perception that it was a niche bank in order to attract the volumes it needed to compete successfully.

No. Pages: 15 

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In 1985, the market regarded Hans Enderle as foolhardy when he resigned from the helm of one of South Africa’s leading hotel chains to launch a new concept in short-stay accommodation. However, by 1990, his City Lodge select service hotel concept boasted seven hotels, with 1 000 rooms. By 2015, the hotel group’s portfolio had risen to 55 hotels and annual turnover had reached more than R1 billion. However, growing competition and increasing customisation within the hotel industry meant that in early November 2015, current group chief executive (CE), Clifford Ross, had concerns about the clarity of the group’s brand and whether it was losing its competitive edge.

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This case is set in 2015, when the City Lodge Hotel Group’s portfolio had risen to 55 hotels and an annual turnover of more than R1 billion. However, growing competition and increasing customisation within the hotel industry meant that in early November 2015, current group chief executive (CE), Clifford Ross, had concerns about the clarity of the group’s brand and whether it was losing its competitive edge. The case positions Ross deciding on how to clearly differentiate the different hotel offerings within the group.

No of pages: 7 pages

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By June 2010, The Coca-Cola Company’s (Coca-Cola) micro distribution centre (MDC) network in Africa had proven to be incredibly successful. Coca-Cola had built up the network to distribute its products through small, independent local entrepreneurs to even smaller outlets, enabling the company to reach markets that traditionally had been very difficult to access. Now social marketers were approaching Coca-Cola for permission to distribute their own products using the MDC network. Paul Fourie, group strategy and business planning director of Coca-Cola Eurasia and Africa, soon had to present his recommendations to Coca-Cola and its bottlers – and wondered what he should suggest as the way forward.

No.of pages: 18

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In September 2012, IT firm Dimension Data paid out R1.26 billion to the various participants in a broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) deal that the company had signed eight years earlier. When Dimension Data had first embarked on its empowerment journey, legislated BEE in South Africa had been in its fledgling stages and, to a large extent, companies such as Dimension Data had to write their own rules. On the eve of the payout, Jeremy Ord, Dimension Data’s executive chairman, reflected on the outcomes of the deal, including the successful growth of the company’s Middle East and Africa (MEA) division. He wondered, too, what he would do differently, if he had to do it all over again.

No of pages:  18

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In September 2012, IT firm Dimension Data paid out R1.26 billion to the various participants in a broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) deal that the company had signed eight years earlier. When Dimension Data had first embarked on its empowerment journey, legislated BEE in South Africa had been in its fledgling stages and, to a large extent, companies such as Dimension Data had to write their own rules. On the eve of the payout, Jeremy Ord, Dimension Data’s executive chairman, reflected on the outcomes of the deal, including the successful growth of the company’s Middle East and Africa (MEA) division. He wondered, too, what he would do differently, if he had to do it all over again.

No of pages:  18

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On 1 September 2009, as financial services firm, Discovery Ltd was about to release its annual results for 2008/2009, its chief executive officer (CEO) and founder Adrian Gore, took some time to consider the company’s trajectory since its inception 16 years ago. Discovery was now in the top 40 on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). This year’s results were excellent: in the context of the global economic crisis, operating profit had grown by 32%. Still, Gore was not one to remain satisfied with these achievements. He had worked hard to instil an ethos of entrepreneurship and innovation in the organisation. Now he wondered whether he had done enough to sustain that into the future and what the next opportunity would be.

No. of pages: 25

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Rob Angel, CEO of Engen, was concerned about the future of his company. By early 1998, the fall-out of the Asian crisis had affected world markets, including the JSE. A low stock price and global industry conglomeration increased the possibility of a hostile take-over, and the end of much of what Angel had accomplished. In June 1998, Petronas formally offered to buy out all the shareholders of Engen Petroleum Ltd. Angel needed to have a clear recommendation ready for the Engen board meeting planned to discuss the Petronas offer. The Petronas offer reflected a good strategic fit, but the price was low, and there was some concern about the operational integration of the two companies. If he were to recommend rejection of the Petronas offer, what other options should he pursue?

No.of pages: 9

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In July 1997, Maurice Radebe moved from a successful, eight-year career at Shell Oil South Africa to take up the position of retail manager at Exel Petroleum, a black economic empowerment (BEE) company newly started by energy and chemical company Sasol Oil and a consortium of black shareholders. His career prospects at Shell had been good. But South Africa was at an interesting juncture in its history, spirits were high because of the successful 1994 elections, and BEE was in its infancy. Radebe was intrigued about the opportunities in this new space and felt impelled to explore them further. Sitting in his sparsely furnished office in Rivonia (north of Johannesburg), Radebe wondered how to ensure the success of a new venture that would have to compete against the major global oil brands.

No of pages: 13 pages

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In July 1997, Maurice Radebe moved from a successful, eight-year career at Shell Oil South Africa to take up the position of retail manager at Exel Petroleum, a black economic empowerment (BEE) company newly started by energy and chemical company Sasol Oil and a consortium of black shareholders. His career prospects at Shell had been good. But South Africa was at an interesting juncture in its history, spirits were high because of the successful 1994 elections, and BEE was in its infancy. Radebe was intrigued about the opportunities in this new space and felt impelled to explore them further. Sitting in his sparsely furnished office in Rivonia (north of Johannesburg), Radebe wondered how to ensure the success of a new venture that would have to compete against the major global oil brands.

Categories: BEE, Strategy,

No of pages: 13 pages

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In July 2015, Stefanie Pietzsch, guest relations and marketing manager of The Fairway Hotel, Spa & Golf Resort, a Johannesburg-based luxury city resort owned by property developer Guvon Investments, considered introducing a loyalty programme to reward her loyal guests. In recent years, hotels in Johannesburg had experienced the effects of slow economic conditions with an overall drop in room occupancy, which had resulted in increased competition. Pietzsch preferred a loyalty programme to be implemented at hotel rather than group level, but how prepared were both the Guvon Group and The Fairway for such a programme, and would a loyalty programme be an appropriate customer acquisition and retention strategy for the hotel?

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In February 2008, eight months after FirstRand Limited sent Stephan Claassen to India to gather insights for a market-entry strategy into that country – the initial preference being to set up as a retail bank – Claassen presented a strategy to the board that focused on setting up as a corporate investment bank in the Africa-India corridor. He knew he had done well in convincing FirstRand’s board of the strategy, but now wondered about other opportunities that would present themselves, and how the team in India would incorporate them into what would become FirstRand Bank India.

Categories: Strategy,

No of pages: 11

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FirstRand Limited in South Africa gave its full support to Stephan Claassen, Dr Theunie Lategan, Rohit Wahi, Mahendran Moodley and the team in India to proceed with the Africa-India corridor corporate investment bank, with the understanding that they should do what they could to develop other markets at a later date. With the go-ahead, the team finalised and sent their banking licence application to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).

Categories: Strategy,

No of pages: 6 

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On 17 February 2017, Thomas Quinn, the managing director of online florist, Flowers4U.co.za[1], received an irate email from one of his clients. The client was still not satisfied with a solution he had proposed the day before to make up for unmet expectations regarding flowers delivered on Valentines’ Day. Quinn wondered how best to respond.

No of pages: 3

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This case is based on a real event, but the names of the company and its employees have been disguised.

In September 2016, Wits Business School MBA student, Rishka Reddy was reviewing the information she had gathered for a proposal she was considering putting to Andreas Joehle, chief executive officer (CEO) of the Paul Hartmann Group, a leading international supplier of medical, hygiene and healthcare products. The proposal, which she hoped would result in an internship opportunity at Hartmann, presented Reddy’s strategy on how Hartmann could best expand into sub-Saharan Africa.

While Reddy reviewed her notes, the question at the forefront of her mind was how, with an available budget of R500 million, to develop an innovation strategy that aligned with Hartmann’s global goals and values, while considering the unique context of operating in sub-Saharan Africa.             

No of pages: 25

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With many years of experience as an entrepreneur and businessman, Alan Reeves, chief operating officer (COO) of Legendary Retail Brands (LRB), which was the shareholder and administrator of the Mica, DIY Depot and House of Paint and Décor voluntary buying group (VBG) brands, was continuously thinking about the next step for the group. Member profitability was good, despite a tough economic environment, but Reeves was aware that this could change easily. “That’s why we need to plan ahead for the next five years,” he thought.[i] As he planned for the next board meeting in September 2016, Reeves considered the options for the group and what he could recommend regarding the way forward.

No of pages: 14 pages

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[i] Beswick, C. and Soicher, A. (2016), Interview with Alan Reeves, 13 July 2016, Johannesburg.

In mid-2017, David Gluckman, director of Lumkani, contemplated the company’s next strategic move. Lumkani, a South African start-up company, manufactured an early-warning fire detection system designed for shack-dwellers in informal settlements, with the aim of reducing deaths and damage due to fire in those communities.

No of pages: 11 pages

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Marketing manager at South African Breweries, Trevor Hughes, investigated how best, to meet the needs of both an established, sophisticated market and, at the same time, the markets in townships and rural areas. He had hired a consultancy firm which had not produced results. He wanted to prevent a repeat failure. A number of dilemmas had to be addressed to ensure ‘value for money’. Hughes pondered over which firm he should hire, wondering whether he should give preference to a local firm, or an international one that had a long working history with SAB. How could he measure success?

No. Pages: 32 

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It was 21 February 2006. Maria Ramos, CEO of Transnet, one of the largest parastatals in South Africa, was facing a strike by the unions, representing more than 85 000 people. After consulting government and key customers, the Transnet board had chosen to cut away those of its businesses not associated with freight transport after the government, its sole shareholder, had given it a mandate to reduce the cost of doing business.

The memorandum given by the unions to Alec Erwin, the Minister of Public Enterprises, stated that they were embarking on rolling mass action in protest against “unilateral decision-making, unilateral implementation, undermining and disrespecting labour and its members”. It said: “Labour wishes to place on record the following: We remain ideologically opposed to privatisation of strategic public assets which can benefit the masses of our people, the workers and the economy as a whole particularly infrastructure delivery, training and job retention and creation.” It declared that the unions were “absolutely right to insist on a genuine process of negotiation over the restructuring of the Transnet Group.”

Strike action had started in the Eastern Cape on 13 February. The Northern Cape and Western Cape followed suit on 14 February. Transnet workers in Gauteng, North West, Mpumalanga and Limpopo had then joined the protests on 20 February.

Ramos and Pradeep Maharaj, Transnet’s group executive of strategy, were reviewing COSATU’s statement, which declared: “The unions are absolutely right to insist on a genuine process of negotiation over the restructuring of the Transnet Group, including proposals to privatise Freight dynamics, the Transnet Pension Fund Administration, Autopax and the Blue Train, and plans to transfer SAA, Metrorail and Shosholoza Meyl out of Transnet and to move other business units within Transnet. They looked at each other. Had they made the right strategic decisions?

No.of pages: 10

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Massmart acquired Game in September 1998. Unlike its own mass retailer, Dion, which had experienced difficulties since 1993, Game had enjoyed great historical success. The merger of the two businesses was an obvious decision, but Massmart was haunted by the fact that its attempt to merge Dion and Makro five years previously had proven to be a disaster. This case examines the complexities of mergers and acquisitions by comparing and contrasting Massmart’s Dion/Makro merger with the Dion/Game merger.

No. Pages: 23 

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In July 2009, businessman and entrepreneur, Martyn Mills of MCM Wines, reconsidered his marketing strategy. He had been exporting his own wine to China since 2003 and had recently signed an agreement with the prestigious South African wine estate, Groot Constantia, to export its wine to that country as well. However, conducting business in China was complex and expensive and, earlier that year, he had partnered with a new importer in China to help combat certain of the challenges. Mills wanted to support his new business partner as much as he could in promoting MCM wines; however, he had a limited budget. Given this fact, how could he grow his market in China, he wondered?

No. of pages: 22

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It was June 2011 and South African passenger rail company, Metrorail, was celebrating its success in moving passengers during the 2010 FIFA World Cup™. The organisation had done much to improve its infrastructure, safety and image for the event. Now Lucky Montana, group chief executive officer (CEO) of the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) – the state-owned enterprise that owned Metrorail – considered what the organisation should do to ensure that Metrorail become the preferred, regular transport service for thousands of daily commuters still using taxis or their own cars.

No of Pages:  13

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Since the opening of Mowana Spa at the Indaba Hotel in Fourways, north of Johannesburg, three years ago, marketing manager Sharon Hunink had sought to create an experience that would entice her customers to return again and again. The spa industry was becoming increasingly competitive and now, in September 2015, Hunink was reviewing all that she and her team had done to create an experience that would set Mowana apart from the many other day spas in the suburb of Fourways. She wondered what the spa was getting right and what else it could do to grow its customer base.

Pages: 20

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It was mid-June 2005 and Jason Lurie, managing director of the Johannesburg-based Moyo restaurant chain, wanted “world domination” for the Moyo brand. Moyo restaurants – which contained a food, entertainment and retail shopping component – had achieved phenomenal success in the affluent suburbs of Johannesburg and Cape Town, and Lurie believed that the brand could be extended to a variety of products and services. As the first move towards achieving world domination, he was considering opening a 4 000 m² retail store.

No. Pages: 18 

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MultiChoice customers and the company’s senior management had asked Eddie Moyce, call centre manager for MultiChoice Africa, a multi-channel television platform, to investigate the possibility of improving the response time from the current 80:30 to 80:20 or even 90:10. Recent research had shown that while customers who had phoned the call centre were generally satisfied with the service they received, they were dissatisfied with the length of time it took for their calls to be answered. What would the impact of reducing response times be? Would it be possible to reduce response times while staying within budget. Management had recently imposed severe austerity measures on the company, even reducing the call centre’s budget in the last two years.

No. Pages: 6 

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Netflorist managing director Ryan Bacher’s wife always gets flowers for Valentine’s Day. His mother always gets some for Mother’s Day. But neither sees him for days around those periods. His head is buried in flowers and gifts, and his mind is racing ahead to ensure that no bouquets are dropped.

When Bacher was involved in establishing Netflorist, the company had the normal teething problems of building a business, but it didn’t have to worry about local online competition. Now, business is doing really well – but it has about 50 competitors, and the numbers are growing daily. In this environment, Bacher’s challenge is to ensure that Netflorist stays on top of its game. Just how to do this is something that occupies his mind as he comes into work every day.

No.of pages: 7

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It was January 2023, and a pivotal time for Thokozile Mangwiro, founder and chief executive officer CEO of Nilotiqa, a South African brand of products that addressed the problems associated with natural hair (African hair that had not been altered using chemical relaxers, texturisers or straighteners). Having established her brand in the market, she was now determined to grow Nilotiqa into a household name. She was considering expanding the range of products on offer, diversifying into different personal care categories and launching the brand in the rest of Africa. Most importantly, however, she was looking for that “one button to push” that would cause customers to see her products as she saw them – both beautiful and functional – and buy them in increasing numbers. What would be the best way of achieving her goals, she wondered. 

No. Pages: 22

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It was November 2014 and just three months since Old Mutual, a well-established, global financial services group, had launched the 2-in-One Savings product to target the South African retail mass market. Anele Mbuya, senior marketing actuary for Old Mutual’s Retail Mass Market, wondered whether the product’s marketing strategy needed to be revitalised for it to achieve the sales forecasts for the next operating period. However, a tight marketing budget, customer perceptions of Old Mutual as a life insurer rather than a savings company and a poor savings culture in South Africa were some of the challenges the organisation faced. Old Mutual had a good track record in developing and implementing marketing strategies aimed at multiple market segments. However, it had still not optimally serviced the retail mass market. Mbuya had to consider how to take advantage of the opportunities this segment presented, and how to address its challenges for the product to achieve its potential.

Pages: 23

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In January 2008, the black-owned Pamodzi Investment Holdings (PIH) was at a crossroads, as its chief executive officer (CEO), Ndaba Ntsele, sat down with his board to discuss how to finance the growth of the business. Ntsele and co-director, Solly Sithole, had founded PIH’s predecessor, Pamodzi Property Developers, and grown it from nothing in 1979 to a multi-million rand concern, using only debt finance and working capital.

PIH, founded in 1997 to take advantage of the opportunities presented by black economic empowerment (BEE) deals, had followed the same funding strategy. But Ntsele wanted to grow PIH into an organisation comparable in size and stature to Anglo American or Bidvest, and he was not sure that PIH could achieve these aims using the same strategy as in the past.

The board was, therefore, considering whether or not to list the company and, if not, how they could raise the funding necessary to achieve the strategic goals of the business.

No.of pages: 13

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Part A of the case is set on the morning of 13 May 2003, when Sean Summers, chief executive officer (CEO) of Pick 'n Pay, one of South Africa's largest supermarket chains, received a registered parcel containing three items of food and a letter. The letter said that these items had been poisoned and that, unless Pick 'n Pay cooperated and paid over a sum of money, the author would put poisoned food items on Pick 'n Pay shelves. The extortionist warned Pick 'n Pay against informing the police or the press, saying that this he would put contaminated food into Pick 'n Pay stores if this happened.

Summers had been with the group for 32 years and this kind of thing had not happened to Pick 'n Pay before. What should he do?

Part B of the case is set seven weeks subsequent to the first threat, after it appeared that the extortionist had actually put contaminated food in one of Pick 'n Pay's stores. Pick 'n Pay had contacted the police for advice, but had kept the matter from the press, confident that the extortionist would not harm its customers. Now it appeared that his strategy had changed. What should Summers do now?

No. Pages: (A) 14 and (B) 2

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This is a background note on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in South Africa. The note defines and explains PPPs as an alternative service delivery option for the public sector, highlighting the legislation that governs PPPs and the Project Cycle. The debate for and against the PPP option for service delivery and PPP performance are examined.

Case relevant to the following topics:  Public Sector service delivery, Other, Strategy

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On 1 July 2013 Claire Reid, founder and director of Reel Gardening, a manufacturer of prefertilised vegetable and herb seed strips, met with Emily Jones, head of Reel Life, the community-focused arm of Reel Gardening. Reel Life aimed to address food security in South Africa by helping low-income communities plant food gardens using Reel Gardening’s products. Reid was concerned that Reel Gardening was not making the profits it needed to fund the growth she envisaged for Reel Life. How could they grow Reel Gardening into a more substantial business, so that Reel Life could have maximum impact on needy communities, she wondered.

No of Pages: 20

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It was December 2009, just over a year since Remgro Limited (Remgro) had completed the distribution of its indirect shareholding in British American Tobacco plc (BAT): 90% of its shares had gone to its shareholders, while the balance of 10% went to a new investment vehicle listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, called Reinet Investments. The shares received by Remgro in Reinet Investments were also distributed to its shareholders. Thys Visser, chief executive officer of Remgro, sat in his Stellenbosch office and reflected upon the transaction, which had resulted in the largest dividend distribution in the corporate history of South Africa. The process had taken approximately two years from start to finish, and Visser concluded that the transaction had been implemented and completed successfully. “Our shareholders got direct access to the asset [BAT shares] and we didn’t sell out – and we found a sustainable solution,” he explained.

Remgro’s market capitalisation had dropped by more than half in the process, with the market value of its interest in BAT comprising 52% of Remgro’s last reported net asset value. Visser thought about whether this would require a change in investment strategy for the company. He was not concerned about the reduction in Remgro’s size, recalling that they had shrunk the business when its international assets were split off into Compagnie Financiere Richemont AG (Richemont) in 1988, and once again when technology-driven investments were placed into VenFin Limited in 2000. Remgro had continued to grow on each occasion, despite the restructuring, and he pointed out that it was what you did with your remaining assets that counted.

No.of pages: 23

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In November 2010, Clifford Barnett – director and co-owner of family business, SA Metal Group (SA Metal) – put his hard hat down on his desk, looked out on the busy scrapyard below his window in Epping, Cape Town and pondered the company’s growth. In 2001, the company had expanded to Gauteng, and its operations there were fast exceeding his expectations. The question confronting him was multifaceted, given the high standards achieved by SA Metal in the Cape. Barnett knew that the company stood on the brink of growth from medium to large in size in an increasingly competitive national and international market. How were he and his brother – managing director Graham Barnett – to achieve the transition in size while, at the same time, retaining the company’s nature as a family business, its ethos of good customer service, its unique human capital formula, its ethical values and its financial success?

No.of pages: 21

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A number of factors affected the chemicals and plastics industry in South Africa during the late 1990s. With South Africa’s acceptance into the global economy after the election of a democratic government in 1994, a new export oriented strategy was implemented to increase international competitiveness. Sasol consulted with the Competition Board in 1998 in order to gain approval of a merger with AECI. The merger was expected to bring about economies of scale and to create a globally competitive explosives giant within the South African borders.

No. Pages: 24 

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In September 2016, Seapei Mafoyane, chief executive officer (CEO) of Shanduka Black Umbrellas (SBU), a business incubator targeting emerging black-owned enterprises, was busy writing her annual review for inclusion in SBU’s 2016 annual report. She believed that SBU had an essential role to play in ensuring the success of black entrepreneurs[1] in South Africa, among whom the failure rate was notoriously high.

No of pages: 18

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[1] In this case study, the author used the term entrepreneurship in its broadest form, and thus it implied all small businesses ventures and not only new, innovative business ventures. 

In April 2010, Siza Mzimela was appointed as chief executive officer (CEO) of the government-owned South African Airways (Pty) Ltd (SAA). She was the seventh CEO to be appointed since 1993. As far back as 2007, the South African government had issued the airline with an ultimatum – ‘get your affairs in order or you are on your own’. Yet the airline was still in a financially disastrous position. Mzimela knew that she had to come up with a workable strategy for SAA, and wondered what the organisation had to do to turn itself around.

No of Pages: 13

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It was December 2016 and almost three years since Rob Collins had been appointed chief operating officer (COO) of Sun International. When Collins arrived at the organisation, he felt that there was a pervasive air of “nostalgia” for the heydays when Sol Kerzner led the group, and that it was in need of change. Since his arrival, he had implemented a number of changes, some of which were still in progress. As the year was nearing an end and people were slowing down in anticipation of their summer holidays, Collins took time out to tackle some of the reading on his desk, which he had set aside for “when he had time”. As he paged through the Harvard Business Review, a leadership article caught his attention and prompted him to pause and reflect on the changes he had made at Sun International. Collins thought about the glory days epitomised by the Sun City “We Will Rock You” television advertisement, which had engaged everyone – customers and staff alike – so effectively in the 1980s. He asked himself what still needed to be done to ensure that the group fulfilled its vision and was able once again to “rock” its customers.

No of pages: 11

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By now, it was June 2018 and group chief strategy and operations officer, Rob Collins, had just received the Sun Way (described below) measurements for Sun City from the company Blueprints. Sun International had contracted Blueprints to help integrate and embed its new business philosophy, as well as to re-engage its staff in the business. As Collins read the scores, he thought about the Blueprints process and how it had evolved since he last used it at Tsogo Sun Gaming in 2005. At that time, it had been a cultural intervention spearheaded and run by the human resources department, but now it embraced the entire business philosophy of the organisation and was run by operations. The scores from Sun City were not that different from what Collins had expected. As he wondered how effective the process would be in restoring the “We Will Rock You” era of the 1980s, Collins pondered what his role should be in ensuring that the Blueprints intervention really did bring about change at Sun International.

No of pages: 7

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Having secured the approval of Ashanti’s management team and major shareholder, Lonmin, AngloGold’s strategy for getting the Ghanaian government (as shareholder and regulator), and the over required proportion of institutional and retail shareholders on board centred around demonstrating that the transaction would add value to all stakeholders. However, Steve Lenahan, AngloGold’s corporate officer of corporate affairs, needed to reassess his campaign strategy following the surprise entry of competing bid.

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On 15 October 2003, AngloGold increased its offer to around $1.48 billion, only for it to be countered by Randgold Resources’ bid of $1.7 billion a week later.  The Ghanaian government rejected Randgold Resources’ offer on 28 October 2003, when it publicly announced that it backed AngloGold. However, the deal still to be approved by Ghana’s parliament, the date for which had not been set,Dennison’s next recommendation to Godsell would be on whether value would still be extracted if the process continued indefinitely.

No of Pages: 3

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On a Saturday morning in early October 2015, Choppies chief executive officer (CEO), Ramachandran Ottapathu, made his weekly visit to a Choppies store. While watching the familiar scenes in the Choppies superstore in Gaborone, he considered the company’s strategy to extend its African footprint. Choppies was the leading supermarket chain in Botswana, targeting the lower- to middle-income sectors. The company had 134 stores in three countries: 75 in Botswana, 38 in South Africa and 21 in Zimbabwe. Its major strategic objective was to increase its overall number of stores to 200, and the number of African countries it operated in to six, by the end of 2016. Ottapathu wondered how Choppies could achieve this objective while still growing value for shareholders.

No of pages: 30 pages

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On a Saturday morning in early October 2015, Choppies chief executive officer (CEO), Ramachandran Ottapathu, made his weekly visit to a Choppies store. While watching the familiar scenes in the Choppies superstore in Gaborone, he considered the company’s strategy to extend its African footprint. Choppies was the leading supermarket chain in Botswana, targeting the lower- to middle-income sectors. The company had 134 stores in three countries: 75 in Botswana, 38 in South Africa and 21 in Zimbabwe. Its major strategic objective was to increase its overall number of stores to 200, and the number of African countries it operated in to six, by the end of 2016. Ottapathu wondered how Choppies could achieve this objective while still growing value for shareholders.

No of pages: 30 pages

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From humble beginnings in 1986 with a single store in Lobatse, Botswana, by 2015 Choppies was the leading supermarket chain in Botswana. It was listed on the Botswana and Johannesburg stock exchanges and it had 134 stores in three countries: 75 in Botswana, 38 in South Africa and 21 in Zimbabwe. Choppies was also planning expansions into three other sub-Saharan countries – Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya – by the end of 2016. The company’s aggressive expansion outside Botswana was partly the result of frustration caused by the Botswanan government’s restrictive policies.

No of pages: 6 pages

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Matome Modipa, executive chairman and founder of the Sebata Group of technical engineering and management consultants, enjoyed coming to work. His offices in Midrand, near Johannesburg, had an open and friendly feel, and the pervading ethos reflected the African philosophies of ubuntu and letsemathat he had worked hard to instil in the organisation. Sebata had enjoyed steady growth since its inception in 2006. Now, in October 2013, the company was on the cusp of further expansion, and Modipa wondered how he was going to keep these philosophies alive at Sebata.

No of Pages: 19

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In May 2011, Vino Govender, CEO of the Johannesburg-based On Digital Media’s (ODM) TopTV, felt pleased about the 200 000 subscribers that had been secured in less than one year in the competitive South African satellite pay television (pay-TV) market.

When TopTV commenced services on 1 May 2010, MultiChoice’s DStv had been the dominant player for 15 years. TopTV made a calculated decision to target clients who had not been able to afford pay-TV. This included 60% of South Africans who wanted wholesome, family entertainment but were not particularly interested in sport, which was a major part of DStv’s offering.

TopTV had since extended its target market to include the LSM[1] 6–9 income bracket. Nonetheless, Govender wondered whether this repositioning was sustainable enough to compete successfully in the long run. What strategy, he wondered, should he follow to attract and keep a larger target audience to ensure future growth?

No of Pages:  17

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[1] The South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF) Living Standards Measure (LSM) divided the population into 10 LSM groups – from 10 (highest) to 1 (lowest) and segmented the South African market according to its living standards, using criteria such as degree of urbanisation and ownership of cars and major appliances. [Source: Available www.saarf.co.za (accessed 24 May 2011).]

Ever since she had started Umsinsi Health Care (Pty) Ltd in South Africa in November 2008, Amanda Wilde’s vision had been to place the company, which distributed medical devices, in a trust for all of her employees. When this happened, they would become full partners in the company. However, by August 2013, Wilde was still the sole guardian of the Umsinsi Partnership Trust. She had postponed transferring the trust to her employees until the business was financially stable. With financial stability achieved, Wilde was now concerned whether her employees were ready to take on the responsibilities that came with the benefits of being full partners.

No of pages: 22

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In March 2012, Mark Taylor, managing executive for Online and Vodacom m-pesa, reflected on the 19 months since the launch of m-pesa, Vodacom’s mobile payment platform. M-pesa was a partnership between the South African mobile telecommunications company, the Vodacom Group, and the Nedbank Group Limited.

In a country with high cellphone penetration and more than 15 million unbanked South Africans’ slower than expected uptake was surprising. Taylor was nonetheless convinced that m-pesa had potential – but for it to succeed, he had to find ways to overcome the challenges of making mobile money work in a country like South Africa.

No.of pages: 20

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At the beginning of August 2016, Bridget Harpur, marketing brand manager for Volkswagen Group South Africa (VWSA), and Mark Handley, national sales manager, were debating how to grow sales of the entry-level VW up! that VWSA had launched in February 2015. The entry-level passenger car category was relatively small and highly competitive. The VW up! was VWSA’s first car ever to target this market category. The car had maintained an average 8.5% market share since its launch. Handley and Harpur believed it had potential to build this share, especially among young, urban drivers. The question was how to adjust the communication strategy to capture the attention of this market.

No of pages: 32

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In February 2009, Julian Novak, Woolworths divisional director of food, announced a new strategy for the company’s food division. The South African retail sector had been affected by the global economic downturn[1] and conditions were grim. By August 2008, Woolworths Food had already shown a drop in market share. (See Exhibit 1.) Novak’s new strategy included drastic reductions in prices and a variety of special deals and discounts. It was essential to attract lost customers back into its shops. Would Woolworths be able to do this while maintaining its quality/value proposition and its commitment to providing safe, healthy and environmentally friendly products?

No of Pages: 16

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[1] There had been a 1% decrease in constant prices for the three months ending January 2009, compared to a 0.1% decrease the previous year (2008)

In September 2007, Pindiwe Holomisa and Nomaciko Ngoasheng, started Yahluma Solutions Ltd with the intention of building a fully-owned contact centre in Buffalo City (Eastern Cape), and making use of a Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) incentive to encourage the establishment of business process outsourcing and offshoring (BPO&O) businesses. The Buffalo City centre would take nearly a year to complete. In the meantime, client demand and the desire to earn incomes had led the two to offer part-time outsourcing services, using call centre infrastructure and facilities rented from a disaster recovery (DR) company.

Categories: Business process outsourcing, Strategy

In August 2016, Ana Bonanni, head of Zebra Cabs, a South African metered taxi service based in Gauteng[1], had just finished a radio interview with Cape Talk journalist, Barry Bateman. The interview had focused on the disruption caused by the entry of e-hailing ride service, Uber, into the fragmented South African metered taxi industry, and whether traditional metered taxi services could survive. Zebra Cabs had implemented massive technological and vehicle changes in order to compete. However, Bateman had planted a seed of doubt in Bonanni’s mind. Would the Zebra Cabs business model eventually disappear in favour of Uber? How could she ensure that Zebra Cabs weathered the Uber storm?

No of pages: 18 pages

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Gauteng was one of the nine provinces of South Africa. It was the economic hub and the most populous province, home to 13.2 million people. The province consisted of three large metropolitan municipalities – the City of Tshwane (Pretoria), the City of Johannesburg and the City of Ekurhuleni – and various smaller district municipalities.